Peter Keeble's article 'The Philosophical Method of Exception' (Philosophy Now, Issue 169) prompted my piece 'Two Kinds of Intelligibility / What Induction Cannot Explain.' Peter kindly responded to me by email after reading the expanded version on this site. What follows is the exchange.

This morning I read an article by Peter Keeble in Philosophy Now magazine. He references two seminal texts in the history of philosophy and epistemology. Edmund Gettier “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” and Nelson Goodman “Fact Fiction and Forecast” (the famous “Grue” argument). Keeble seems to undermine the point of the “Grue” argument a bit. ”Causality works through various known regularities” – yes. However the fact that inductive reasoning is beset by accusations of circularity is not trivial for philosophy. Insofar as we are committed to statistical probability as the foundation for “a kind of knowledge,” that knowledge will always be relative.